

The Knapsack

Raleigh Civil War Round Table

The same rain falls on both friend and foe.

**Jan. 10th, 2022 &
Feb. 14th, 2022
Our 251st & 252nd
Combined Issue**



**Volume 22
Numbers 1 & 2**

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Feb. 14th, 2022 Meeting Featured Jeff Hunt, M.A., Speaking on the Topic of His Book *Meade and Lee at Bristoe Station: The Problems of Command and Strategy after Gettysburg, from Brandy Station to the Buckland Races, August 1 to October 31, 1863*

The Raleigh Civil War Round Table's January 10th, 2022 in-person/simultaneous Zoom meeting, featuring noted Civil War lecturer Freddie Kiger, was unfortunately cancelled due to the rapidly-spreading omicron variant of the Covid-19 corona virus. We seem to be snake bit in our efforts to bring Freddie before the Round Table — he was previously scheduled to speak to us in May of 2020, a presentation cancelled due to the ramped up original Covid-19 virus.

The NC Museum of History suspended all scheduled events for Jan. and Feb., 2022, as the spread of the omicron variant of the Covid-19 corona virus was predicted to peak in mid-January. The suddenness and lateness of the spike in Covid-19 cases left insufficient lead time to find a substitute Zoom-only speaker for January's meeting. Freddie's talk has been rescheduled for the April 11th, 2022 meeting. He will be speaking on the topic *"Sheer Adulterated Violence": The Battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam.*

Our February 14th, 2022 meeting was Zoom-only and featured Jeff Hunt, M.A. in History from U.T.-Austin, speaking on the topic of his book *Meade and Lee at Bristoe Station: The Problems of Command and Strategy after Gettysburg, from Brandy Station to the Buckland Races, August 1 to October 31, 1863* (published Aug. 19th, 2018).



Jeff Hunt


Jeff last presented to our Round Table at our July 2021 meeting. His well-received topic then was based on his book *Meade and Lee After Gettysburg: The Forgotten Final Stage of the Gettysburg Campaign from Falling Waters to Culpeper Court House, July 14–31, 1863* (published Jul. 19, 2017).

These two books were the lead volumes of an intended trilogy, with the third book being *Meade and Lee at Rappahannock Station: The Army of the Potomac's First Post-Gettysburg Offensive, From Kelly's Ford to the Rapidan, October 21 to November 20, 1863* (published Mar. 2nd, 2021).

Since then, Jeff has decided to go "all in" and is currently working on a fourth book concerning "Meade and Lee", so, perhaps, it's best to call these works a "series". The topic of this next book is Meade and Lee at Mine Run, a campaign fought between November 7 and December 2, 1863. Given the quality of the first three, his fourth tome is eagerly anticipated.

Synopsis

*The Civil War in the Eastern Theater during the late summer and fall of 1863 was anything but inconsequential. Generals Meade and Lee continued where they had left off, executing daring marches while boldly maneuvering the chess pieces of war in an effort to gain decisive strategic and tactical advantage. Cavalry actions crisscrossed the rolling landscape; bloody battle revealed to both sides the command deficiencies left in the wake of Gettysburg. It was the first and only time in the war Meade exercised control of the Army of the Potomac on his own terms. Jeffrey Wm Hunt brilliant dissects these and others issues in *Meade and Lee at Bristoe Station: The Problems of Command and Strategy After Gettysburg, from Brandy Station to the Buckland Races, August 1 to October 31, 1863.**



Meade and Lee at Bristoe Station is a fast-paced, dynamic account of how the Army of Northern Virginia carried the war above the Rappahannock once more in an effort to retrieve the laurels lost in Pennsylvania. When the opportunity beckoned Lee took it, knocking Meade back on his heels with a threat to his army as serious as the one Pope had endured a year earlier. As Lee quickly learned again, A. P. Hill was no Stonewall Jackson, and with Longstreet away Lee's cudgel was no longer as mighty as he wished. The high tide of the campaign ebbed at Bristoe Station with a signal Confederate defeat. The next move was now up to Meade.

Hunt's follow-up volume to his well-received Meade and Lee After Gettysburg is grounded upon official reports, regimental histories, letters, newspapers, and other archival sources. Together, they provide a day-by-day account of the fascinating high-stakes affair during this three-month period.

Twelve Notable Instances of Rail Transportation During the Civil War

A Twelve-Part Series by Bob Graesser, Editor

Introduction


This is part nine of a twelve-part series (listed below) in which I examine in chronological order some of the most notable instances of how rail transportation played a critical role in the Civil War. Part nine starts after events described in part eight: the Union retaking of Chattanooga, Tennessee, “The Gateway to the South”, from General Braxton Bragg’s Confederates in the battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge in November 1863. This forced Bragg’s Army to retreat south to Dalton, Georgia. Having had enough, Confederate President Jefferson Davis then replaced Bragg with General Joseph E. Johnston. This set the stage for the Union’s next goal, the campaign to capture the second-most important remaining city in the Confederacy not under Union control: Atlanta, Georgia.

Part 9 Sources

- [Supply of Sherman’s Army During the Atlanta Campaign](#) by Captain Duncan K. Major, Jr., 27th Inf., and Captain Roger S. Fitch, 2nd Cav., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Army Service Schools Press (1911)
- [Supplying Hell: The Campaign for Atlanta](#) by Lt. Nick Overby, Quartermaster Professional Bulletin-Winter (1992)
- [The Atlanta Campaign of 1864 — Word Cloud of Official Correspondence of William T. Sherman during the Atlanta Campaign](#) by Dr. William G. Thomas, III, University of Nebraska–Lincoln (2017)

Prologue


Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, in orchestrating the recapture of Chattanooga, added to his string of victories in the Western Theater of the Civil War, including Ft. Henry, Ft. Donelson, Shiloh, and Vicksburg. As a well-earned reward, Union President Abraham Lincoln, on March 2nd, 1864, promoted Grant to Lt. General, making




*Lt. Gen.
Ulysses S. Grant*

him General-in-Chief of all Union Armies. The only general to previously hold this rank was George Washington.

Recalled east to Washington City, Grant arrived on March 8th, and was formally commissioned by Lincoln the next day at a Cabinet meeting. On March 18th, Grant promoted his friend and favorite subordinate, William T. Sherman, to succeed him in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi.




*President
Abraham Lincoln*




*Maj. Gen. William
T. Sherman*

This consisted of the three great Union armies of that theater: the Army of the Cumberland (IV, XIV, and XX Corps and a cavalry corps) under Maj. Gen.

George Thomas; the Army of the Tennessee (XV, XVI, and XVII Corps) under Maj. Gen.



*Maj. Gen.
George Thomas*




*Maj. Gen. James
McPherson*

James B. McPherson; and the Army of the Ohio (XXIII Corps and a cavalry division) under Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield. At the beginning of the campaign, Sherman outnumbered Johnston 98,500 to 50,000, but his ranks would initially be depleted by many furloughed soldiers, while Johnston would receive 15,000 reinforcements from Alabama. However, by June, a steady stream of reinforce-



*Maj. Gen. John
Schofield*

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- Part 1: Lincoln’s Whistle-Stop Inaugural Journey from Springfield, IL to Washington City, Feb. 11th-23rd, 1861
 - Part 2: Jefferson Davis’s Inaugural Journey from His MS Plantation, Brierfield, to Montgomery, AL, Feb. 11th-17th, 1861
 - Part 3: Reinforcement Via Rail Enables the Confederates to Win the Battle of Bull Run, July 18th-21st, 1861
 - Part 4: The Great Locomotive Chase, a.k.a. Andrews’ Raid, April 12th, 1862
 - Part 5: Greatest Troop Movement by Rail: Rebel Troops from Tupelo, MS to Chattanooga, TN, July 1862
 - Part 6: Supplying the Union Troops by Rail During the Gettysburg Campaign, June 11th-July 7th, 1863
 - Part 7: Longstreet’s Reinforcement of Bragg by Rail to Win the Battle of Chickamauga, Sept. 9th-20th, 1863
 - Part 8: Union XI & XII Army Corps Reinforce and Rescue Rosecrans by Rail in Chattanooga, Sept. 25th-Oct. 6th, 1863
 - Part 9: Supplying Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign via Rail, May 1st-Sept. 5th, 1864**
 - Part 10: Supplying the Union Troops During the Siege of Petersburg, June 15th, 1864-April 2nd, 1865
 - Part 11: Supplying the Confederate Troops During the Appomattox Campaign, April 2nd-11th, 1865
 - Part 12: Lincoln’s Whistle-Stop Funereal Journey from Washington City to Springfield, IL, April 21st-May 4th, 1865




**Secretary of War
Edwin Stanton**


ments would bring Sherman's strength to 112,000.

Grant quickly developed a good working relationship with Lincoln, who allowed Grant to devise his own strategy. Meeting weekly with Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton in Washington, Grant developed a plan for the 1864 campaign season involving five coordinated Union offensives on five fronts, so Confederate armies could not shift troops within their interior lines:


- 1) Grant would make his headquarters with Maj. Gen. George Meade and the Army of the Potomac, which was to make a direct frontal attack on Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.
- 2) Sherman, leading his western armies, was to defeat Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Tennessee, capture Atlanta, Georgia and run roughshod through the Confederate heartland.
- 3) Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler was to advance on Lee from the southeast, up Virginia's James River.
- 4) Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks was to capture Mobile, Alabama.
- 5) Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel was to capture granaries and rail lines in Virginia's fertile Shenandoah Valley.



**Maj. Gen.
George Meade**




Gen. Robert E. Lee




**Gen. Joseph E.
Johnston**



**Maj. Gen.
Benjamin Butler**



**Maj. Gen.
Nathaniel Banks**



**Maj. Gen.
Franz Sigel**

Prior to 1864

The Union's Atlanta Campaign in the summer of 1864, which terminated in the capture of Atlanta, Georgia, represents an excellent example of the methods used in the supply of an army at a distance from its base.


To properly appreciate the enormity of the task confronting Sherman, let's review the supply conditions in the Mississippi Valley leading up to the Spring of 1864. Almost from the beginning of the war, St. Louis, Missouri and Nashville, Tennessee were the principal supply centers of the western armies. The depots at these cities furnished supplies not only for the Atlanta Campaign but also for the troops operating in the Mississippi Valley and to the southwest.

In 1862, Nashville became the advanced base for the Army of the Cumberland, with Louisville, Kentucky and St. Louis still remaining the main depots of supply. The Mississippi and Ohio rivers served as waterways connecting St. Louis to Louisville. In fact, supplies flowed from the northern industrial and agricultural areas primarily via the Ohio River to Louisville. Supplies then moved from Louisville to Nashville via the Louisville & Nashville Railroad. Nashville also received supplies via the Ohio and Cumberland river route.

Since the Cumberland River was navigable for only part of the year and because the Louisville & Nashville Railroad was susceptible to interruption from raids by guerillas or Confederate cavalry, an insurance third line of access to the rear was opened via the Nashville & Northwestern Railroad and the Tennessee River, which was navigable by light vessels during all seasons of the year.


At the beginning of the war, the Nashville & Northwestern Railroad had been completed for a distance of 25 miles from Nashville and some work had been done on it from this point to Johnsonville, which lay on the Tennessee River some 78 miles from Nashville. With the final build-out of 53 miles having been completed, large quantities of supplies were forwarded by this route to Nashville during August, September, and October of 1864, the season of low water in the Cumberland River.

The map below shows these three routes to Nashville:



From 1862 to 1864, Nashville grew in importance as a base, with storehouses for supplies of all kinds. Large warehouses for quartermaster, commissary, ordnance and medical supplies were built and extensive railroad and quartermaster shops established. Sawmills were created to process lumber for the construction of bridges, storehouses, hospitals, etc. Large base hospitals were established to receive and care for the sick and wounded. One of the main remount depots of the Cavalry Bureau was maintained here as well.


Nashville, therefore, became the base of operations for Sherman's army in the Atlanta Campaign. When the campaign began, Nashville was so complete as a depot that, if the supply line back to Louisville or St. Louis were to have been severed, it could still have supplied Sherman's army for several months. For example, in a letter dated April 10, 1864, from Brig. Gen. Montgomery Meigs, Quartermaster General, United States Army, to Maj. Gen. George Thomas, he stated that on that date Nashville had 24,000 rations and grain for 50,000 animals to January 1st, 1865. During the Atlanta Campaign, Nashville issued 41,122 horses, 38,724 mules and nearly 4,000 wagons for Sherman's army.




Quartermaster Gen. Montgomery Meigs

Situation at Campaign Start

Chattanooga, Tennessee in early 1864, was held in strength by part of the Union Army of the Cumberland under Thomas. The most advanced Union post was at Ringgold, Georgia, 15 miles southeast of Chattanooga. Johnston's Confederate Army of Tennessee lay twenty miles farther southeast, at Dalton, Georgia.




Situation at the start of the Atlanta Campaign, showing Chattanooga, Ringgold, and Dalton highlighted.



Key to the above map, showing correct map scale and axes of advance for Sherman's three armies

At a minimum, Sherman calculated that, assuming uninterrupted supply by rail, it would take a Union force of 100,000 men (with 35,000 animals) to successfully oppose Johnston. That did not include the additional troops that Sherman had to set aside to guard his lengthy line of communications all the way back to Nashville. Without rail support, Sherman figured his army would have required over 36,000 wagons and 220,000 mules.

With Nashville as Sherman's main base of supplies, Chattanooga became his advanced base. Here, Sherman's goal was to accumulate and maintain as large an amount of supplies as possible since, not only was Chattanooga 151 miles from Nashville, but also the only line of communication was a single line of railroad in very poor repair passing through country intensely hostile to the Union. Additionally, Sherman's proposed campaign would carry the army still further into Confederate territory.



Map showing Sherman's tenuous single-track supply route

As a result, Chattanooga became the advanced supply depot, second only to the base supply depot in Nashville in importance. Storehouses of all kinds were built, as well as sawmills, railroad repair shops and a rolling mill for straightening the iron rails that the enemy had bent and twisted. Additional hospitals were built and large corrals for horses, mules, and beef cattle were constructed. Vast supplies of forage for the horses, mules, and cattle were kept in the open under tarpaulins.

Accumulation of Supplies by Rail

After having visited his army and corps commanders upon assuming command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, Sherman had immediately traveled to Nashville where, in his own words, he "addressed himself specially to the troublesome question of transportation and supplies."

What he found was that the capacity of the railroads from Nashville to Decatur and to Chattanooga were so small, especially in the number of locomotives and cars, that they

were barely able to supply the daily requirements of the armies depending on them, with no ability to accumulate a surplus in advance. Every day, the train cars were loaded down with men returning from furlough, with cattle, horses, etc., and, as authorized by General Thomas earlier, provisions for the suffering pro-Union inhabitants between Chattanooga and Knoxville.

Consequently, Sherman laid down the law on April 6, 1864, by issuing General Order No. 6 to address these concerns: *To enable the military railroads running from Nashville to supply more fully the armies in the field, the following regulations will hereafter be observed:*

- I. *No citizen nor any private freight whatever will be transported by the railroads, save as herein after provided.*
- II. *Officers traveling under orders or on leave of absence, sick or furloughed soldiers departing from or returning to their regiments, and small detachments of troops will be transported on the orders of post commanders, of Brigadier General Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee, or of the commanding officer of either of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, or the Tennessee, or of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Bodies of troops will not be transported by railroads when it is possible for them to march, except upon the order of the commanding officer of some of the military departments above named. Civil employees of the various staff departments will be transported on the order of the senior and supervising quartermaster of the Department of the Cumberland, at Nashville, Tenn., or of the commanding officer of either of the military departments above named. Employees of the railroads will be transported on the order of the superintendent or chief engineer of the railroads.*
- III. *No citizen will be allowed to travel on the railroads at all, except on the permit of the commanding officer of one of the three military departments or of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and when their transportation will not prevent that of any army supplies, of which the proper officer of the quartermaster's department will be the judge.*
- IV. *Express companies will be allowed one car per day each way, on each military road, to carry small parcels for soldiers and officers. One car per day more on each road for sutlers' goods and officers' stores may be allowed by the senior and supervising quartermaster at Nashville, at his discretion; these cars to be furnished by the express companies and attached to the passenger trains. When a sufficient surplus of stores has been accumulated at the front, the senior and supervising quartermaster aforesaid may increase this allowance, but not before.*
- V. *Stores exclusively for officers' messes, in very limited quantities, after due inspection by the inspecting officer at Nashville, Tenn., of sutlers' goods, and all private stores, shipped to the front, will be passed free on the several roads on the order of*

the senior and supervising quartermaster Department of the Cumberland, at Nashville, Tenn.

- VI. *Horses, cattle, or other live stock will not be transported by railroad, except on the written order of the commanding general of the military departments.*
- VII. *Trains on their return trips will be allowed to bring up private freight, when the shipment thereof does not interfere with the full working of the roads, of which the senior and supervising quartermaster at Nashville will be the judge.*
- VIII. *Provost-m Marshals have nothing to do with transportation by railroads. Their passes merely mean that the bearer can go from one point to another named in their pass, but not necessarily by rail. The railroads are purely for army purposes.*
- IX. *When the rolling stock of the railroads is increased, or when a due accumulation of stores has been made at the front, increased facilities may be extended to passengers and private freight, of which due notice will be given. Until that time citizens and sutlers must use wagons.*
- X. *Until the railroad is relieved, all military posts within 35 miles of Nashville and 20 miles of Stevenson, Bridgeport, Chattanooga, Huntsville, and Loudon must haul their stores by wagons.*
- XI. *The general manager of the railroads, and his duly appointed agents and conductors, will control the trains and will be authorized to call on every passenger for his orders for transportation by railroad, that they may be returned to the general manager or superintendent. The military guard will enforce good order, and sustain the agents and conductors of the roads in their rightful authority, but will report any mismanagement or neglect of duty through their officers to these headquarters.*
- XII. *Until other arrangements are perfected, commanding officers on the request of railroad managers, will furnish details for providing wood or water at such points as may be necessary to supply the trains.*

Through the enforcement of General Order No. 6, the daily accumulation of supplies at the front was doubled. But even this was not enough to sustain Sherman's one hundred-thousand men, thirty-five thousand cavalry and draft animals, and beef on-the-hoof. As he later reported:

I, accordingly, called together in Nashville the master of transportation, Colonel Anderson; the chief quartermaster, General J. L. Donaldson; and the chief commissary, General Amos Beckwith, for conference. Allowing for occasional wrecks of trains, which were very common, and for the interruption of the road itself by guerillas and regular raids; we estimated it would require one-hundred and thirty cars, of ten tons each, to reach Chattanooga daily, to be reasonably certain of an adequate supply.

Even with this calculation, we could not afford to bring forward hay for the horses and mules or more than five pounds of oats or corn per day for each animal. I was willing to risk the question of forage ... because I expected to find wheat, and corn fields, and a good deal of grass as we advanced into Georgia at that season of the year.

The problem then was to deliver at Chattanooga and beyond, one-hundred and thirty car loads daily, leaving the beef-cattle to be driven on-hoof, and all the troops in excess of the usual train guards to march by the ordinary roads.

Colonel Anderson promptly explained that he did not possess cars or locomotives enough to do this work. I then instructed and authorized him to hold on to all trains that arrived at Nashville from Louisville, and to allow none to go back until he had secured enough to fill the requirements of our problem. At the time, he only had about sixty serviceable locomotives, and about six hundred cars of all kinds, and he represented that to provide for all contingencies he must have at least one hundred locomotives and one thousand cars.

In order to further increase the capacity of the railroad, Sherman recommended that empty trains return via Decatur: *Write a note to superintendent of railroad in Nashville that I have been over all the road and am of the opinion that all loaded trains should make a continuous circuit from Nashville by way of Decatur to Stevenson, and back to Nashville over the old road with empty cars. A separate set of trains could run from Stevenson up to Chattanooga and beyond. Not a citizen or pound of private freight should be carried until all the troops have been supplied.*

Staff Departments

From the time Sherman was given command of the Atlanta Campaign on March 18th until the campaign kicked off on May 7th, Sherman found himself tied up in red tape concerning reporting structures, especially the peculiar relation of the Superintendent of the Military Railroads with himself, the Commander of the troops in the field. This, however, is only in keeping with the frustrating relation of the officers of the other staff departments to Sherman, of whom he complains about in the following letters:

NASHVILLE, TENN.

March 24, 1864 (Received 2:30 a.m. 25th)

To: Adjutant General, Washington

I find my staff officers curiously situated, as Lieutenant-Colonel Donaldson and Colonel Beckwith proposing to act under special orders of the Secretary of War. I want my own staff under my own sole control, but of course subject to any inspection the Secretary of War or the Commanding General may order. I will assign these officers to duty according to their rank, without changing their post at all. I understand that Colonel Swords is not subject to my orders, and therefore shall name General Robert Allen as Chief Quartermaster.

[signed] W. T. SHERMAN, Major General

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In reply to the above letter, the following was received:

WAR DEPARTMENT

Adjutant General's Office

Washington, March 25, 1864 — 3 p.m.

To: Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman, Comdg. Mil. Div. of the Miss., Nashville, Tenn.

Sir:

Your telegram of yesterday's date has been submitted to the Secretary of War, who instructs me to reply —

First. That Colonel Donaldson and Colonel Beckwith are assigned to their respective duties at Nashville by the War Department, in accordance with the established rules of the service. They form no part of your staff and are not subject to your assignment.

Second. That neither Colonel Swords nor General Allen are subject to your assignment, but are assigned to their duties by the Quartermaster General, under the direction of the Secretary of War; and only in case of misconduct, requiring immediate action, are they subject to your orders, other than to answer requisitions for supplies.

Third. If any commissary or quartermaster within the limits of your command, though not under your orders, misbehave or fail to perform their duty you are authorized to suspend them and report the facts to the War Department, through the chief of the proper bureau for action, and, if necessary, you are authorized to place the party in arrest until the direction of the Secretary of War can be obtained.

Fourth. These regulations have uniformly prevailed, and their observance by commanders of departments and military divisions is essential to the service, but any suggestion from you will be considered and carried out so far as the service and the proper administration of the War Department will be maintained.

[signed] F. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant General

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In connection with the above subject, the following correspondence is inserted:

*HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIV. OF THE MISSISSIPPI
Nashville, Tenn., April 6, 1864*

To: General M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster General, Washington, D. C.

General:

I ought to have an officer of your department. Here we see an anomalous condition of affairs, viz., a Commander of an independent army in the field forbidden to exercise any control over the principal supply officers at his own base of supplies with me whose power is co-extensive with my own, whom I can freely converse with, explain plans, figures, reports, and everything.

Now I have to deal with four independent departments, besides depot and district supervising quartermasters. Anyone you name will be satisfactory to me, especially General Robert Allen. You saw enough out here to know that a general commanding should have such a quartermaster close by him all the time to direct the harmonious working of this vast machinery.

I am, with respect

[signed] W. T. SHERMAN, Major General

HEADQUARTERS — MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

Nashville, April 8, 1864

To: General Robert Allen, Louisville

Dear General:

Draw me up a programme whereby orders may issue from the War Department enabling you to act as my chief with power to visit by yourself or inspectors every part of my command, to direct the course and accumulation of supplies, the distribution of the means of transportation, and all details purely pertaining to your department. I must have some quartermaster whose sphere is co-ordinate with my own, and the Quartermaster-General seems to recognize the necessity.

I suppose you can remain at Louisville, though I would prefer you to be near me, especially if we advance beyond the Tennessee. I enclose you a copy of my General Orders, No. 6, which will give us daily some thirty and odd cars, and instead of yielding to the pressure of civilians I am inclined to be more rigid. I will have down on me all the Christian charities who are perambulating our camps, more to satisfy their curiosity than to minister to the wants of the poor soldier. My universal answer is that 200 pounds of powder or oats is more valuable to us than that weight of bottled piety.

As to sanitary goods, they can come here where they can be distributed as other stores, according to the known wants of the troops. I want you to back me in this, as I know the President and Secretary of War, yielding to ex parte clamor, will fail to see my reasons, nor will I explain them till asked for you might do so. I must accumulate to the front at once as large a surplus as the capacity of the road will accomplish.

Yours truly,

[signed] W. T. SHERMAN, Major General

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HEADQUARTERS — MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

In the Field, Chattanooga, April 30, 1864

To: General Allen, Chief Quartermaster, Louisville

At last, after I have started to open a desperate campaign, the Secretary of War denies me the service of a chief quartermaster. Well, I must do the best I can with you at Louisville, Donaldson at Nashville, and Easton here. The confusion in the wagons of Memphis illustrates how important it is I should have a chief near me. One division of white troops will remain at Vicksburg, one division at Memphis; all others will come to this quarter. All wagons, mules and horses should take the same general course.

Wagons, mules and horses can best reach us here via Clifton and the Tennessee River, as long as the two divisions rendezvousing at Cairo are coming that way as escort. All the furloughs are out, and these troops should now be all en route. After they have come the way will be safest from Louisville to Nashville, etc. won't wait for me to be all ready, but I must when

others are ready.

[signed] W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General

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HEADQUARTERS — MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

In the Field, Chattanooga, May 3, 1864

To: General M. C. Meigs, Washington, D. C.

General:

I received yours of April 26 and agree with you that the chief quartermaster of the army, if they want to control its economy, should be with the main armies in the field, and not at Louisville, Chicago, and Washington. I think Secretary Stanton has made a mistake in denying me the services of General Allen. By a general supervision of the whole department he could save more money to the Treasury than by scrutinizing 1,000,000 separate vouchers of purchase and expenditure. Also, by providing means of transportation at the very time and in the manner demanded by events which cannot always be foreseen, a quartermaster can assist in achieving success and, being at headquarters, he could be consulted and could act understandingly instead of receiving short categorical orders by the telegraph, which is almost as mischievous as useful.

You often feel disposed to find fault with commanders of troops for not consulting the experienced quartermaster. I want to do so but the chief quartermaster is at Louisville, another at Nashville, another here, all under my orders, but each so circumscribed by conditions that I cannot disturb them. I know this is wrong, and instead of commanding an army thus a general but drifts with its fate.

As to tents: You will need all kinds, and, as in clothing, must bend a little to fashion. The Sibley is the best when transportation is easy, wind high, and wood scarce, as on the prairie. The common wedge is the best when no boards can be ripped off our neighbors' houses and fences with which to make sidings to the bivouacs, and when officers study to have handsome camps, which all general officers will and should encourage. The tent debris is of course good for a roof as long as the men can take boards off the fences and houses of the people, or can split out shakes, but for men to use these tents for any time would be wrong, because it brings their persons too near the ground. I prefer no tent at all for marching troops and the common "A" tent without poles for a camp of several days, weeks, or months, but repeat that in tents there is a fashion almost as despotic as in dress.

I write hastily from the same house in which General Grant was, but I go to the front, Ringgold, tomorrow or next day and will dispense with tent. My entire headquarters transportation is one wagon for myself, aides, officers, clerks and orderlies. I think that is as low down as we can get until we get flat broke, and thenceforward things will begin to mend. Soldiering as we have been doing for the past two years, with such trains and impediments, has been a farce, and nothing but absolute poverty will cure it.

I will be glad to hear Uncle Sam say. "we cannot afford this and that -- you must gather your own grub and wagons,

and bivouac and fight, not for pay, but for self-existence." I think I see that period not far distant. I assure you I will second any effort you will make looking to economy, and first to that end have your chiefs at the very points where they can see the causes and prevent waste. Old men as auditors can control the papers to the rear, but the causes are here. I would like Mr. Stanton to know this, my opinion.

I am, with great respect, your friend,
[signed] W. T. SHERMAN, Major General, Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS — MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
Nashville, Tenn., April 6, 1864

To: General J. P. Taylor, Commissary General, Washington, D. C.:

I ought to have near me an officer of your department clothed with power co-extensive with me. And yet the authorized transportation at that time was much less than at present. The trains of an American division today occupy two-thirds as much road space as the troops own, who could converse with me freely, learn my plans, the strength of my various columns, routes of march/nature of supplies, and everything, and who could direct the harmonious working of the whole machine. Now I have to deal with four distinct commissaries with no common recognized head.

Colonel Kilburn would be perfectly satisfactory to me, or, indeed, any officer of experience you may name. I ask the detail of such an officer to be made and to emanate from the highest authority, that his acts would be final.

[signed] W. T. SHERMAN, Major General

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NASHVILLE, TENN., April 15, 1864

To: General J. P. Taylor, Commissary General

No commissary has yet reported to me. Colonel Beckwith is not here. I must have by May 1 near Chattanooga a large amount of beef-cattle on the hoof, and each commissary is making separate contracts utterly useless. We cannot supply transportation for cattle. They must travel by land, and I may be forced to seize breeding cattle in Tennessee to supply meat, for we can't wait our movement for such matters of economy.

[signed] W. T. SHERMAN, Major General

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That Sherman was right in his argument to have representatives of the affected Staff Departments on his own immediate staff seems obvious. Should there, however, be any doubt, the following correspondence of a general commanding an army of 100,000 men should be convincing.

Sherman was indeed his own chief quartermaster and chief commissary. In the following letters, he corre-

sponds at one time with the quartermasters at St. Louis and Louisville, then with the quartermaster at Nashville, and repeats the same as regards the associated commissaries:

CINCINNATI, April 16, 1864

To: General W. T. Sherman

I learn that 8,000 cattle, large size, were bought on hoof at Nashville about 10th instant. I think they will be enough for number of men mentioned. I leave here tomorrow to join you.

[signed] C. L. KILBURN, Lieut. Colonel and Assistant Comm'y General

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HEADQUARTERS — MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
Nashville, Tenn., April 17, 1864

To: Colonel Kilburn, Commissary of Subsistence, Cincinnati, Ohio

I want on the Tennessee River, at or near Bridgeport, beef cattle on the hoof to be driven along with the army about May 1, enough for a month's supply for 75,000 men. Inquire what has been done to that end, and order what is necessary in my name. I wish you to come down.

[signed] W. T. SHERMAN, Major General

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SAINT LOUIS, April 18, 1864

To: Gen. W. T. Sherman

Will the 3,000 head of cattle you require at Cairo be wanted to start with the expedition? The number is so large I fear I shall have to pay a very high price if I purchase at once. They can be procured, but at not less than 7 cents gross, delivered here. If necessary to have them at once, I will furnish them.

[signed] T. J. HAINES, Colonel and Commissary of Subsistence

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HEADQUARTERS — MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
Nashville, Tenn., April 18, 1864

To: Colonel Haines, Chief Commissary, Saint Louis

The price is nothing. [Ed: note the barely concealed exasperation] I want the Army of the Tennessee to have beef cattle on the hoof at or near Huntsville by May 1. The easiest way is to send them up to Clifton, on the Tennessee, and drive across. They should come up the Tennessee at the same time with the troops from Cairo.

[signed] W. T. SHERMAN, Major General

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As shown above, there was no General of Communications responsible to Sherman for the forwarding of supplies and for the guarding and maintenance of the Line of Communications: Sherman supervised this work himself.

LOUISVILLE, April 18, 1864

To: General W. T. Sherman

Telegraphed you on the 16th, directed to Moscow. Am using prompt, and I hope successful, means to get the cattle to Bridgeport by the first proximo. I do not intend the commissary department shall be behind in furnishing your supplies. The contractor is here. I am urging him to be up to time. Have seen General Allen. Have his promise that the contractor has cars from Chicago and here for his cattle. Have ordered Major Symonds to buy at once cattle and ship by boat or drive. Have ordered Major Du Barry to buy at once and ship by boat. Have ordered the 1,200 cattle which we had in reserve at Danville, Ky., to be driven at once to Nashville.

[signed] C. L. KILBURN, Lieutenant Colonel

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By the time the campaign opened on May 7th, Sherman had collected about one month's worth of supplies at Chattanooga for his army. Remaining supplies left over from the Chickamauga Campaign and the Siege of Chattanooga were also available. These stores were at Decatur, Alabama and at Bridgeport, Alabama on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad.

Maintaining and Extending the Supply Line

The 151 mile-long Nashville & Chattanooga railroad was a single line over which passed all the supplies for the armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee during the Atlanta Campaign. It provided transportation for sending to the front provisions, clothing, and camp equipment for the men, forage for animals, arms, ammunition, and ordnance stores, reinforcements, and all the varied miscellaneous supplies required to keep an army active in the field. At the same time, it was the means by which the sick, wounded, disabled, and discharged soldiers, refugees and freedmen, captured prisoners, and materials deemed advisable were sent to the rear.


About 115 miles of track were re-laid with new iron rails, cross-ties, and ballast from February, 1864 to the end of the war. Sidings were put in at intervals to be not more than eight miles apart, each capable of holding five to eight long freight trains, and telegraph stations were established at most of them. In all, nineteen miles of new sidings were added to this railroad and forty-five new water tanks were erected.

When Sherman began his drive on Atlanta from Ringgold on May 7th, the Confederates did as much damage as they could to the Western & Atlantic Railroad as they gradually yielded ground and fell back toward Atlanta. Union reconstruction work on the railroad commenced immediately and kept pace with movements of Sherman's army.

By mid-1864, most of Sherman's railroad capacity was completed either by construction or repairs. Along the routes he established small detachments of soldiers to protect track, depots, bridges, telegraph lines, protect


track, depots, bridges, telegraph lines, and communications. Accompanying the garrisoned detachments were construction corps personnel to maintain and repair the railroads.

As Sherman's army fought its way farther south, the detachments moved with it. These detachments stockpiled such repair equipment as spikes, bridge timbers, cross ties and rails. The construction personnel would repair from both ends by carrying construction cars with the repair equipment. The railroad network helped the forward movement of supplies to the front. Without the sufficient rail operations and railroad maintenance, the distribution of supplies would have been impossible.



Maj. Gen.
Joseph Wheeler

During the spring and summer of 1864, a few occasional guerilla raids were made upon the line, but they caused little damage to property or transportation delay. About Sept. 1, 1864, Confederate Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler destroyed seven miles of road between Nashville and Murfreesboro. In Dec., General Hood destroyed seven and three-fourths miles of track and five hundred and thirty feet of bridges between same stations. In both cases, the road was promptly repaired and trains were running in a few days.



Gen.
John B. Hood

Joseph E. Johnston was a conservative general with a reputation for withdrawing his army before serious contact would result; this was certainly his pattern against George B. McClellan in the Peninsula Campaign of 1862. But in Georgia, he faced the much more aggressive Sherman.

Johnston's army repeatedly took up strongly entrenched defensive positions in the campaign. Sherman prudently avoided suicidal frontal assaults against most of these positions, instead maneuvering in flanking marches around the defenses as he advanced from Chattanooga towards Atlanta. Whenever Sherman flanked the defensive lines (almost always around Johnston's left flank), Johnston would retreat to another prepared position. Both armies took advantage of the railroads as supply lines, with Johnston shortening his supply lines as he drew closer to Atlanta, and Sherman lengthening his own.

Keeping Supplies Close at Hand

Sherman continually pushed his advanced depot to the rear of his army. From there, the ordnance and engineer trains moved ahead of all supply and baggage trains and were parked as close as safely possible to the front line. Next came the ambulance train and supply wagon trains, including sufficient forage and rations.

In order to compensate for any delays caused by weather or any other disruptions, it was Sherman's intention for his troops to have on hand at all times 20 days rations, green forage, and beef on the hoof. In practice, however, it was usually the case that only 8 or 10 days rations could be

kept on hand. Of these, the men would carry a three-day supply in their haversacks, the remainder being in the supply trains. As to ammunition, 200 rounds were provided per man: 40 rounds carried by the soldier, 60 rounds carried in the division ordnance train, and 100 rounds carried in the corps ordnance train. As →

Johnston's army fell back from one strong position to another, it tried to delay or prevent Sherman's pursuit by damaging the line. However great the damage done, it was so speedily repaired that Sherman soon ceased to fear any delay from this cause, and made his advance movements with complete confidence that the railroad in his rear would be "all right."
(continued on page 11)



From May 7th to Sept. 1st, 1864, Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman and his three armies of the Military Division of the Mississippi used repeated flanking maneuvers to eventually wrestle the Confederate Army of Tennessee all the way back to Atlanta along the axis of the single-track Western & Atlantic RR line. First, Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnston proved to be too overly cautious and was sacked. Then his replacement, Gen. John B. Hood, proved to be too recklessly aggressive and ended up having to concede Atlanta. Casualties for the campaign were roughly equal in absolute →

numbers: 31,687 Union (4,423 killed, 22,822 wounded, 4,442 missing/captured) and 34,979 Confederate (3,044 killed, 18,952 wounded, 12,983 missing/captured). But this represented a much higher Confederate proportional loss. While Sherman then marched east to the sea, Hood escaped Atlanta and headed north where he shattered his Army of Tennessee with futile frontal attacks against the Union army defenses under Maj. Gen. John Schofield at Franklin, Tennessee and the combined Union army defenses under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas and Schofield at Nashville, Tennessee.


Sherman had an advantage in his game of chess with Johnston in that he was able to call forth geographical knowledge from twenty years earlier when he had been stationed in Georgia. He also assembled information on the railroads, distances, networks, topography, and characteristic of every local setting his army occupied. This intense geographic vision became the defining feature of his "railroad generalship."

In July, Davis replaced Johnston with the more aggressive General John Bell Hood, who began challenging the Union Army in a series of costly frontal assaults. Sherman eventually bottled Hood's army up in the siege of Atlanta. After Sherman's men captured the last remaining rail line into Atlanta, the city fell on Sept. 2nd, 1864. At this point, Sherman's supply line extended back 473 miles to Louisville, Kentucky.

The capture of Atlanta made an enormous contribution to Union morale, was an important factor in the reelection of President Abraham Lincoln, and set the stage for Sherman's March to the Sea, in which he, ironically, completely abandoned his cherished supply line and had his army subsisting off the land.

Final Operations

From Nov. 15th until Dec. 21st, 1864, Sherman led some 62,000 soldiers on a 285-mile march in two columns covering a 30-mile swath from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia. His soldiers did not destroy any of the towns in their path, but they stole food and livestock and burned the houses and barns of people who tried to fight back. In retrospect, Sherman's March to the Sea hastened the end of the war.



Maj. Gen. William Hardee

Arriving in Savannah, Sherman first linked up with the Union naval fleet for resupply. Confederate Maj. Gen. William Hardee, and his 10,000 troops who had been guarding the city, chose not to fight but fled instead. Savannah surrendered peacefully on Dec. 21st, 1864. In return, the citizens and their property were left unharmed. Sherman presented the city and its 25,000 bales of cotton to President Lincoln as a Christmas gift.

Early in 1865, Sherman and his men left Savannah and pillaged and burned their way through South Carolina. In March, Sherman defeated Bragg at Bentonville, North Carolina. In April, Sherman captured Raleigh. This led to Johnston's surrender to Sherman at Bennett Place near Durham Station on April 26, 1865. Coupled with Lee's surrender to Grant at Appomattox Court House, the war was over.

Later, ex-Confederate railroad officers said they were less surprised at Sherman's military success than they were at the rapidity with which breaks in the railroad were repaired, and the regularity with which trains were moved to the front. It was only when Sherman's methods were fully explained, could they comprehend the mastery of his "railroad generalship."

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Current Status of the Coronavirus Pandemic

Editor's note: The Johns Hopkins University of Medicine has had a public Coronavirus Resource Center website since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020 (COVID-19 Map - Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center (jhu.edu)). They now also track Vaccine Doses Administered, both Total and within a sliding 28-Day Window. Number of Cases and Number of Deaths are also being tracked within a sliding 28-Day Window as well as by Total. Both U.S. and World figures are tracked for all these parameters.

United States				
Since 1/1/2020	2/14/2022	12/13/2021	11/7/2021	10/9/2021
Total Cases	77,808,188	49,921,405	46,461,714	44,290,052
Pct Change from Previous Reading	+55.9%	+7.4%	+4.9%	+9.8%
Total Deaths	920,621	797,346	754,278	712,693
Pct Change from Previous Reading	+15.5%	+5.7%	+5.8%	+9.4%
Total Vaccine Doses Administered	544,297,766	481,829,159	427,664,862	399,175,036
Pct Change from Previous Reading	+13.0%	+12.7%	+7.1%	+6.5%
Past 28 Days				
Total Cases	11,902,096	2,835,286	2,124,146	3,428,197
Pct Change from Previous Reading	+319.8%	+33.5%	-38.0%	-18.9%
Total Deaths	65,662	33,358	40,285	52,833
Pct Change from Previous Reading	+96.8%	-8.3%	-23.8%	+8.8%
Total Vaccine Doses Administered	18,260,464	39,524,266	23,774,666	19,205,517
Pct Change from Previous Reading	-46.2%	+16.6%	+23.8%	+0.9%
The World				
Since January 2020			11/7/2021	10/9/2021
Total Cases	412,665,299	270,162,556	249,538,695	237,227,127
Pct Change from Previous Reading	+52.7%	+9.2%	+5.2%	+6.7%
Total Deaths	5,820,309	5,306,114	5,044,795	4,842,478
Pct Change from Previous Reading	+9.7%	+5.2%	+4.2%	+5.5%
Total Vaccine Doses Administered	10,221,130,070	8,439,148,141	7,226,136,580	6,424,712,258
Pct Change from Previous Reading	+12.1%	+16.8%	+12.5%	+15.6%
Past 28 Days				
Total Cases	83,140,530	16,378,126	11,862,348	13,461,577
Pct Change from Previous Reading	+407.6	+38.1%	-11.9%	-24.9%
Total Deaths	272,705	204,797	194,691	226,443
Pct Change from Previous Reading	+33.2%	+5.2%	-14.0%	-16.8%
Total Vaccine Doses Administered	742,266,667	894,687,299	711,127,530	760,800,039
Pct Change from Previous Reading	-17.0%	+25.8%	-6.5%	-22.2%

Key: a green box indicates a % decrease in the rate of an illness parameter versus the previous month. A box with a red % indicates a % increase in the rate versus the previous month. Double figures are indicated in bold. Opposite rules apply to vaccines, where higher percentages over time are better.

The spike caused by the omicron variant is clearly shown above, even accounting for the fact that it's been 2.5 months since the previous reading instead of one month. The U.S. reached another sad milestone as the number of covid-19-related deaths has now passed 900,000. That we are now on the down-slope of the winter omicron spike has resulted in the announcement that our March 2022 meeting will be in-person at the Museum plus Zoom.

News of the RCWRT



Upcoming 2022 RCWRT Meetings

We are currently **not** meeting in person. Instead, for Feb., we met remotely via Zoom software. This was due to the increased virulence of the omicron variant of the Covid-19 virus. In March, we will meet in person plus Zoom.

Date	Speaker(s)	Topic
Jan. 10 th , 2022	Freddie Kiger	Battle of Antietam /Sharpsburg (Cancelled)
Feb. 14 th , 2022	Jeff Hunt	Meade and Lee at Bristoe Station (Zoom only)
Mar. 14 th , 2022	Gary Dyson	Ambush of the Isaac P. Smith (In person plus Zoom)
Apr. 11 th , 2022	Freddie Kiger	"Sheer Adulterated Violence": The Battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam
May 9 th , 2022	Cindy Pratt	The 135th U.S. Colored Troops Civil War Trail Marker to be displayed in Goldsboro, NC

Correction

In the "Did You Know?" section on this page of the Dec. 2021 issue of the Knapsack, I incorrectly stated that there had only been three editors of the Knapsack during its existence. I failed to mention that the Knapsack founder, Bob Farrell, was the original incumbent, making a total of four editors who have held the position.



Bob Farrell
2001-2003



Charles Hawks
2003-2010



Andrew Ballard
2010 - July 2018



Bob Graesser
Aug. 2018 - Now



Save the Slaughter Pen Farm Forever and Retire the Loan

In 2006, battlefield preservationists were able to save the Slaughter Pen Farm, the heart and soul of the Battle of Fredericksburg, from industrial development with an investment of \$12 million. Today, this hallowed ground has been preserved and restored – but the work isn't over.

After refinancing, the loan is being paid off over a 20-year period. If \$400,000 can be raised to cover the loan payment in 2022, an anonymous benefactor will double that and donate \$800,000! This would pay off the loan in full, saving five years of interest charges. Every \$1 you donate will be matched by \$2 in kind. For more information, click [here](#) or visit <https://www.battlefields.org/give/save-battlefields>.



The Knapsack

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Bob Graesser, Editor

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Griff Bartlett

Readers are encouraged to submit photos, events, & articles for publication to Bob Graesser, Editor
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
RCWRT Board of Directors (2020-22)

Name	Position
Josie Walker	President / Program Committee
Ted Kunstling	Past President
Johnny Wood	Vice President / Program Committee
Griff Bartlett	Secretary / Treasurer
Pattie Smith	Program Committee
Bob Graesser	Knapsack Editor / Webmaster
Wayne Shore	Member
Lloyd Townsend	Member

Paying Memberships / Total Members: 129 / 159

3 New Members Joined the RCWRT in Dec./Jan. 2021-2:

We welcome Dick Whitaker of Kernersville, NC (Dec.), and John & Margaret Champion of Chapel Hill (Jan.)



The Raleigh Civil War Round Table was formed on March 12th, 2001 and is a 501(c)(3) "tax exempt organization."

We meet on the second Monday of each month (except this Dec.). We are once again meeting in person at the NC Museum of History, 5 East Edenton Street, Raleigh, NC starting at 6:30 p.m. to allow 30 min. for mingling.

Annual membership dues are \$30 (individual and family) and \$10 for teachers. Student membership is free. Half-year memberships are available March through May for \$20. Dues should be submitted to Griff Bartlett, Treasurer, 908 Kinsdale Drive, Raleigh, NC 27615-1117 by **Sept. 15th** each year.